PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus 88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-03-31 07:49:08Z) 135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name) 445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB) 464/tcp open kpasswd5? 593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0 636/tcp open tcpwrapped 3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name) 3269/tcp open tcpwrapped Service Info: Host: FOREST; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
解释完之后咱们接着往下做,把SharpBlood.exe用evil-winrm传上去,之后再配合BloudHood来搜集信息查找攻击路径,这里是选择The shortest path to Domain Admin
发现了这么一条比较合理的路径,因为SVC-FRESCO用户属于ACCOUNT OPERATORS组,而ACCOUNT OPERATORS组对EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSION组有GenericAll权限,所以我们可以通过SVC-FRESCO对EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSION创建一个高权限用户(就和之前Support里创建万能委派账号是一个样的), 而又因为EXCHANGE WINDOWS PERMISSION对HTB.LOCAL拥有WriteDacl权限,我们显然可以通过刚才所创建的高权限用户修改HTB.LOCAL的DAcl ,以此来赋予刚才创建的高权限账户对域内更高的权限(这里是赋予了Dsync权限,来导出域内用户的hash),稍微总结一下我们的攻击路径。